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Analyses of several surveys of businessmen's short-run expectations have
consistently revealed a surprising degree of inaccuracy in the forecasts.
Accordingly economists have tended to write them off as containing little
useful information. As a result, the resources allocated to several such
surveys have been sharply reduced. The analysis of one survey, the
Canadian Employment Forecast Survey, has for instance been all but
abandoned. When judged against this background, Hart's gallant attempt
at rehabilitating the railroad shippers' forecasts undoubtedly represents an
original and significant undertaking. However, we feel that his analysis,
for all its ingenuity, has merely succeeded in scratching the surface of a
very complex and interesting problem: why are the reported anticipations
of all these surveys so systematically yet preposterously regressive? We
propose to show that an answer to this question will have to be found
along lines quite different from those suggested by Hart, and that this
redirection in turn raises serious questions concerning the appropriateness
of Hart's correction and the interpretation of his corrected series.
The Issues that Need to be Explored
The essence of Hart's approach is that since the poor forecasting record
of the shippers' survey can be traced to the reasonably stable systematic
understatement of the change over the four quarters previous to the time
for which the forecast is made, we can more closely approximate future
change by correcting the original forecasts for this understatement. The
resultantseries—Hart's"reconstituted"anticipations—is,bycon-
struction, free of the systematic bias. The most obvious use would be as
an improved predictor of future changes, and we shall test whether such
series provide better forecasts than can otherwise be obtained. But Hart
proposes that, whether or not the corrected series can provide good pre-
dictions, they have a second use of possibly even greater potential value
as measures of businessmen's short-run expectations. For a knowledge of
prevailing business anticipations can be used to predict changes in other
Mom: This paper originated as a comment on Albert Hart's paper in this volume.
For useful and stimulating assistance, we are greatly indebted to James W. Harpel.
We also wish to express our thanks to Michael C. Lovell for reading the manuscript
and making many valuable suggestions.
239REGRESSiVENESS IN SURVEYS OF EXPECTATIONS
production and investment variables which depend on plans made in the
light of these anticipations. Here, however, an explanation must be
furnished to show why a manipulation of the original series provides a
more accurate picture of businessmen's expectations than the original
forecasts themselves.
Hart's justification for his "correction" arises from his unwillingness
to believe that the regressive anticipations which surveys report could
possibly be the expectations on the basis of which current operating
decisions are made. He therefore has suggested several hypotheses which
attempt to explain regressiveness as the consequence of distortions picked
up in the transmission and aggregation of the individual responses. We
shall examine these hypotheses, and shall then test the underlying assump-
tion made by Hart and other previous analysts that the source of the
regressive behavior of the aggregate forecasts is to be found in the collec-
tion and collation of the survey responses rather than in the respondents'
anticipations themselves. In so doing, we shall attempt to isolate the source
of the regressiveness to be explained.
The Forecasting Value of "Reconstituted" Anticipations
Hart's paper provides the reader with a bewildering array of statistics
bearing on the forecasting quality of the H-series. There are several
different tests, whose relation to each other is not always clear, and for
each test several results are usually given, each result being based on a
different subsample of the observations, selected according to various
criteria. We have therefore endeavored to sift out the relevant results and
to present them in a systematic and compact form in Table 1. There is only
one test for which all the data available for the interwar period have been
used. In every other case we are forced to rely on the results of tests which
omit the last two years, 1940 and 1941, and trust Hart's judgment that the
omission does not significantly affect the outcome.
Like previous analysts of the shippers' forecasts, Hart tests predictive
value by verifying whether his "corrected".series gives a more accurate
prediction than is provided by simple extrapolative formulas based exclu-
sively on the past behavior of the variable to be forecasted. As can be seen
from Table 1, Hart has carried out basically four tests, differing from each
other in terms of the variable to be predicted (column 2) and of the vari-
ables used in the extrapolative formula (column 6). For each test, two
measures of predictive accuracy are provided. The first consists of a
comparison of the simple correlation between the variable to be predicted
and the H-prediction (column 5) with the correlation between the same
dependent variable and the extrapolative forecast (column 7)—a compari-
son, in other words, of the gross predictive values of the two types of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.REGRESSIVENESS IN SURVEYS OF EXPECTATIONS
H-prediction in a multiple correlation involving both the extrapolative
variables and the H-prediction as independent variables—an index, in
other words, of the net forecasting value of the H-prediction.'
The outcome of the first test (in which the variable to be predicted is
the four-quarter change) is quite favorable to the H-prediction. The
figures of column 5 are appreciably higher than those of column 7, and the
figures of column 8 are fairly impressive, implying a partial correlation
of close to 0.6.
Similar results have been obtained by Douglas Hartle in a study of the
Canadian Employment Forecast Survey.2 While his analysis is primarily
concerned with the important question of separating the sampling errors
in the survey from the forecast errors in the population, it does provide
evidence on the regressiveness of the survey forecasts. The substantial
underestimation of actual four-quarter change by the forecasts is indicated
by the following regression equation of forecasted on actual change
(1) I = 11+0.008
The corresponding equation reported by Hart for the railroad shippers'
forecast is:4
(2) (E1/A,_4)— 1 = l}+O.27
It is evident that the underestimation of forthcoming change is, if anything,
even more pronounced in the Canadian survey than in the shippers'
survey.5 When the coefficients of equation 1are used to correct this
systematic bias in reported expectations, the correction appreciably
improves the original predictions of employment, raising the correlation
with actual change from 0.26 for the unadjusted data to 0.47 for the
"reconstituted" forecasts.6 Furthermore, a test analogous to the first
1 The. figures in column 8 are partial determination coefficients—that is, partial
correlation coefficients squared.
2 Douglas Hartle, "Predictions derived from the Employment Forecast Survey,"
Canadian Dept. of Labor, May 1957, mimeographed. (This paper has since been pub-
lished in the August 1958 issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,
but all references here are to the mimeographed version.)
3 The Canadian survey requested respondents to make two four-quarter change
forecasts of employment, one for three months ahead and one for six months ahead.
Equation 1is computed from a scatter of 31 six-month forecasts made in quarter t—2,
plotted against the corresponding actual changes in Hartle, Chart 2.
4 Computed from Hart's equation on p. 212 and footnote 14.
5 The higher regression coefficient of equation 2 may partly reflect Hart's exclusion of
observations at or near major turning points. More important, however, a large standard
error is associated with the regression coefficient of equation 1. The correlation coef-
ficient is small, even though significant at the 0.001 level, so that the two estimates of
the regression coefficient of (E,/A1_4) on (A1/A,_4) obtained by alternately minimizing
the variation of and are materially divergent from one another. By
using the computation procedures of the principal components technique a more
accurate representation of the average understatement of four-quarter change could be
obtained; this procedure would yield a regression coefficient closer to that obtained for
the shippers' forecasts.
6 Coefficients of determination for 31 observations.
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test in Table 1 shows that the correlation between actual change and the
corrected forecasts is substantially higher than for the predictions obtained
by extrapolating the previous actual change.7
Clearly the "reconstituted" series represent a great improvement over
the unadjusted anticipations, for the uncorrected published forecasts
perform appreciably worse than even the naïve-model forecasts. At the
same time, however, it should be remembered that the naïve model used
in this test is indeed naïve. The extrapolative prediction is roughly equiva-
lent to forecasting shipments or employment in the next quarter by an
extrapolation of the level of the current quarter, adjusted for seasonal
variation by the ratio of the levels of the corresponding quarters of the
year before.8 This is obviously a most primitive way to adjust for seasonal
variation. The favorable results of the first test can thus be of limited
significance at best.
The results of the second test indicate that a forecast based on a pro-
jection of the seasonally adjusted level of shipments of the previous
quarter has appreciably higher gross predictive value than Hart's
H-prediction. And column 8 shows that even the net forecasting value,
though significant, is modest. These conclusions are confirmed by the last
two tests, which are in effect variations of the second. The third test shows
that normal seasonal variation accounts for a greater part of the un-
adjusted quarter-to-quarter fluctuations of shipments than does the H-
prediction. The last test shows that the H-series is of little use in predicting
quarterly change arising from forces other than the recurrent seasonal
variation. The simple correlation between the seasonally adjusted quarterly
change and the H-prediction is only 0.3, somewhat less than that for an
extrapolative model based on a projection of previous seasonally adjusted
changes; the partial correlation confirms that the H-forecast has essentially
no net predictive value.
It is evident that the series manufactured by Hart represents a con-
siderable improvement over the published anticipations. However, its
7Thecoefficient of determination of the relation between actual change and the
corrected forecasts is 0.38 (for 39 observations), compared with 0.13 for the extrapolative
predictions. The past change inthisinstanceis 1],rather than
[(At—i/At—5) —1]as in Table 1, since the employment forecasts corrected are six-month
forecasts.
8Usingthe superscript f to denote a forecast, the extrapolative formula used as a
naïve model prediction in Hart's first test is basically of the form Ac/Aj—4=A,—i/At—s
which implies By the same token, when the extrapolative model
relies on At—2, the adjustment for seasonal variation is performed by the ratio, Ag_4/Ag_6.
To the extent that Ag-5 (or Ag—4/At—ó) does reflect a trend in addition to purely
seasonal and random factors, the forecast is not, strictly, a seasonally adjusted pro-
jection of the level of the current quarter. However, projecting the trend which existed
between two quarters a year ago is hardly a sensible procedure. This interpretation of
the naïve forecast used as an alternative in the first test is, of course, only approximately
valid. The extrapolative forecast is not strictly of the above form since the regression of
Ag/At_4 on A,_1/Awill in actuality involve a constant term and slope coefficient which
are not precisely zero and one, respectively.
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record does not appear to necessitate a significant revision of the con-
clusion of Hultgren, Ferber, and other previous analysts that, at least in
the interwar period, the shippers' forecasts are of little use in predicting
shipments.9
It should be recognized that the fact that E1 is known substantially
earlier than means that the tests hitherto discussed underestimate
the usefulness of the H-index as a forecasting device. However, since the
tests of Table 1 indicate thatcontains little information about forth-
coming changes in shipments from the current rate, the practical fore-
casting usefulness of any "reconstituted" anticipations must lie primarily
in its being a proxy for information on current developments.'0 Not that
the forecasts merely mirror the rate of activity at the time of the survey.
Indeed, as Hart has pointed out, the movement of the shippers' forecast
cannot be fully accounted for by the previous course of shipments. It
appears, however, that the nonextrapolative element in the forecast,
whether or not it is a reliable indication of the mood of the respondents,
does not on balance contain much information of significant net fore-
casting value.
"Reconstituted" Anticipations as Measures of Expectations
We now turn to Hart's claim that a "corrected" series can represent
a truer measure of businessmen's expectations than the original published
anticipations. Hart's reasoning is that the systematic regressive bias in
the forecasts is picked up during the collection and aggregation of the
individual responses. The most direct test of this hypothesis would be to
examine Hart's presumption that the anticipations of individual respond-
ing firms are nonregressive. Unfortunately no information about the fore-
casts made by individual firms is available for the shippers' survey. We do
have such information, however, for a number of surveys conducted by
Dun and Bradstreet, and we propose to rely rather heavily on the evidence
thus provided.
9Wehave not made tests analogous to the last three of Table 1 for the Canadian
Employment Forecast Survey. However, in a forthcoming book to be published by the
University of Press, Hartle has tested the forecasting value of the survey
when compared to naïve models using seasonally adjusted data. His preliminary results
indicate that our also applies to his survey.
10Hartlehas advanced some interesting evidence on this point. He found that the size
of the understatemerfl of actual ch4nges in the Canadian employers' survey seemed to be
a function of cyclical changes in employment. When [(At/At-4)— 1] was increasing be-
tween surveys, the magnitudes of the four-quarter changes were understated by the
forecasts. Conversely, even though the forecasts understated A1/Ai_4 —1on the average
(as indicated in equation 1), E:/A,-4 tended to become larger than Al/At_4 when the
rate of change of Ag/At....4 was negative. (Hartle, pp. 16-18 and Chart 2.) This behavior
corresponds to expecting change in employment to be a fraction of actual four-quarter
changes lagged one to two periods—or, in other words, to recognizing only part of
recently occurred changes. (Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow and Marc Nerlove, "A Note on
Expectations and Stability," Economeirica, April 1958, pp. 297—300.)
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The Dun and Bradstreet survey is similar to the shippers' and employers'
surveys in several essential respects. Respondents are asked to report
anticipations for the forthcoming quarter in terms of the change expected
from the corresponding quarter of the year before."The same dismal
forecasting record is displayed.'2 Most significantly, the predictive record
CHART!
Monthly Manufacturers' Sales in the Fabricated
Industry, 1948—1949
Metal Products
J FM AM.) .JA SO ND.)F MA MJASON 0.)F MAN.)
ofthe survey is characterized by the same occurrence of regressive one-
quarter forecastsarising from systematically downward-biased pre-
dictions of four-quarter change.
Chart 1, collated from the responses of the fabricated metal products
industry, illustrates this regressiveness.The dash line indicates monthly
11 Inthe early surveys, including two of those analyzed below, the Dun and Brad-
street survey experimented with asking respondents to forecast for periods other than
simply the forthcoming quarter. Respondents were asked, in the April 1948 survey, to
forecast sales for the year 1948 and, in the May 1949 survey, to forecast sales for the
next six months. In every case, however, the reference point was the corresponding
period of the year before. The form in which 1] was reported also varied.
In the April 1948 survey respondents reported the change in sales between the first
quarter of 1947 and the first quarter of 1948; in all other surveys, respondents reported
current sales in the month in which the survey was made over sales in the same month
of the preceding year.
12Cf.Franco Modigliani and Owen H. Sauerlender, "Economic Expectations and
Plans of Firms in Relation to Short-Term Forecasting," Short-Term Economic Fore-
casting, Studiesin Income and Wealth, Vol.17, Princeton University Press for the
C
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sales adjusted for seasonal variation; the solid continuous line super-
imposed on the monthly indicator shows the movement of average sales
per month in each quarter, also seasonally adjusted. Each of the three
forecasts available is shown as a floating point tied back by a thin line to
the average level of sales in the previous quarter.13 These forecasts, all
made following a sustained fall in sales, exhibit the same trend-reversing
patterns characteristic of the shippers' forecasts: the expected change in
sales from the level of the year before —1]is smaller than the
seasonally adjusted change that has already occurred [(sA1_,/SA,_4) —1]
so that the forecast implies the expectation of a sudden reversal of the
existing trend. Such regressiveness was characteristic of the forecasts of
other industries covered by the surveys.'4 This is illustrated in Chart 2
which shows, for each industry covered by the survey, the average four-
quarter change in sales expected by the respondents in August 1949
plotted against the average past change reported by them.15
If the average past change reported by the respondents were the change
that had occurred between the reference date of the forecast and the time
the forecast was made, then Chart 2 would clearly indicate the regressive-
ness of the survey. Recall that extrapolation of level means
(3) =
where,as in Hart's paper, the sisused to denote seasonally adjusted data.
From this it is evident that if (3) holds, then
(4) —1 —1=(sA,_1/sA,_4)—1
where the first identity follows from the obvious fact that quarters 1 and
t —4 represent the same season of the year. Extrapolation of trend, on the
other hand, means > sA1_1 when > and conversely, or
(5) 1 1 10
By the same token, reversal of trend, or regressiveness, means <
when > and conversely, or
(6) —1 —1as —10
13Thefloating point tied back by a thin line follows Hart's usage.
14Fornondurable goods industries, the results of an additional survey conducted in
April 1948 is available. In spite of the fact that any regressiveness in this survey is
obscured to some extent because respondents were asked to forecast sales for the entire
year (as a ratio to 1947 sales), the regressive pattern held in this survey as well.
15Thepoints in the scatter of Chart 2 are weighted averages of the individual responses
in each industry. One industry, the primary metal producers, is omitted. This industry
was sharply "antiregressive" in the August survey, forecasting a decline in sales of
36 per cent for the last quarter of 1949 from the last quarter of 1948—more than double
the 16 per cent decline from August 1948 to August 1949 reported by the responding
firms. This unusual forecast, however, was obviously shaped by the impending steel
strike which began on October 1. As a result of the work stoppage, steel output dropped
from about 85 per cent of rated capacity in late September to close to 8 per cent in the
first two weeks of October, and seasonally adjusted manufacturers' sales of iron and
steel declined 40 per cent. (Cf. Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Commerce, October
and December 1949.)
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CHART2
Forecast Change and Past Change in Sales in Each Industry
in the August 1949 Survey
Thus, plotting 1] against 1], equation 4 would
be represented by a straight line at 45° through the origin. Points falling
on or close to this line would represent industries which, on the average,
anticipate a continuation of the present level. Similarly, since the region
defined by equation 5 is the portion of the plane falling between the 45°
line and Y-axis in the northeast and southwest quadrants, points falling
in this region would represent industries which anticipate a continuation
of the previous trend. All remaining points would correspond to industries
anticipating a reversal of trend.16
16 Moreprecisely, those observations falling between the 45° line and the X-axis
(corresponding to the shaded area in Chart 2) represent regression in the original sense
of wiping out some of the increase or decrease which occurred between t—4 and t—1.
Those falling in the northwest and southeast quadrants also represent anticipated
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Unfortunately we do not know the average value of [(sA1_1/SA,_4) —1]
for the sample of firms responding in each industry. However, the survey
did request each respondent to report the change which had occurred
between t—l and t—5, and we may reasonably suppose that (A1_1/A1_5)
will not, as a rule, differ significantly from As a first approxi-
mation, then, we can use 1] as a proxy for the change
occurring between the benchmark date of the forecast and t —1.Chart 2
can therefore be interpreted much as if —1]were plotted on
the horizontal axis. But we must now be somewhat more cautious in our
interpretation.
In the first place, even though [(A,_1/A1_5)— 1] should be close to
1], the difference between the two is not likely to be purely
random. Because trends typically last well over a year, it follows that
change over four consecutive quarters will often be larger than the change
which occurred over three of those quarters, so that the relation between
the two will be of the form
(7) —I=(I+
kis a positive number. If trends were linear and of indefinite
length, the four-quarter change would beas large as the three-quarter
change so that the value of k would be 4.Butsince in fact trends are
far from continuous—especially for individual firms or small aggregates
of firms—k is likely to be, on the average, a good deal smaller than 4,
thoughalmost certainly positive. Solving equation 7 for [(SA,_1/sA1_4)_ 1]
and substituting the result in equation 4, the condition for extrapolation
of the existing level—the borderline, in other words, between extrapolation
and reversal of trend—becomes
(8) 1 =[1/(1+k)][(A,_,/A,_5)— 11
The line dividing the regions will thus be inclined at somewhat less than
45 degrees.' ba
J6aItshould be reiterated that whether any given observation should be classified as
either extrapolative or regressive depends upon the relative Jevel of that firm's sales in
i—S and t—4. Not having this information for each firm, we are forced to draw a
boundary line corresponding to the average relationship between and in
each industry. Our proposition is thus that, on the average, this averageboundaryline
is inclined at not much less than 45°. It should be noted, however, that the slope of the
borderline can in certain circumstances be greater than unity—or even negative. In
the usual case described above, is between and and k is positive. If,
however, then k is zero and the boundary line is the 45° line. Again, if
is outside rather than between SA,_5and k will be negative and, providing
that Sllg—5isbetween and the slope of the boundary will be greater than
unity. In the rare case where SA,_5and are on opposite sides of EAt—i, k< —I so
that the borderline corresponding to extrapolation of level is actually negatively sloped.
Such exceptions frequently occur at or shortly after major turning points in the business
cycle, since at such times the change which occurred from t—4 to f—I may well be in
the opposite direction to what occurred between t—5 and t—4.
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The second point to be kept in mind in interpreting this chart, is that,
once we replace with (A,_1/A,_5), the position of an observa-
tion no longer tells us with certainty whether the anticipations are extra-
polative or regressive. A dot falling in the trend reversal area is likely to
represent a regressive expectation, especially if it is far from the boundary,
but it might on occasion correspond to an extrapolative anticipation if it
happens that the seasonally adjusted change from t—5 to t—4 were
abnormally large compared with the change from t —4 to t —1.Similarly,
a dot in the extrapolative region might occasionally correspond to a
regressive anticipation if the change from t —5 to t —4 were in the direction
opposite to that from t —4 to t —1 and sufficiently large. But such patho-
genic instances seldom occur. Though inferences about individual observa-
tions must be subject to some uncertainty, it is clear that if most of the
dots fall in one particular region we can be confident that the anticipations
are prevailingly of the type thus indicated.
Looking at Chart 2 in the light of these considerations, there can be
little doubt that the anticipations are prevailingly regressive. Out of 18
observations only 3 fall in the extrapolative region as against 15 falling in
the trend reversal region, 11 of which are regressive in the original,
narrow sense. This count would be essentially unchanged if the boundary
had a slope as low as 0.85.
This visual impression is fully confirmed by regression analysis. The
regression of expected four-quarter change on recent past change is:17
(9) (E1/A,_4)— 1 = 11—0.001
This result is representative of the relation between the average expected
change and the average past change for individual industries in the other
Dun and Bradstreet surveys.
Equation 2 indicates that, on the average, the anticipated change is
only about half as large as we should expect if anticipations tended to
represent an extrapolation of the recent level. The regression coefficient
is strikingly similar to that reported by Ferber for the shippers' forecasts
and to the systematic downward bias estimated by Hart.'8 There seems
therefore, to be ample ground for confidence that evidence from the Dun
and Bradstreet surveys can be utilized to test Hart's hypothesis and, more
generally, to throw light upon the source of regressiveness in the shippers'
and similar surveys.
17 The coefficient of determination is 0.51,whichis significant at the 5 per cent
level.
18 Both coefficients were about 0.44. Robert Ferber, TheRailroadShippers' Forecasts,
Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, 1953, pp. 70-71,
equations 4.1.6 and 4.1.7; and supra equation 2.
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Previous Explanations of Regressiveness
Tn suggesting that the systematic, regressive bias in surveys of short-
run business expectation is picked up in the transmission and aggregation
of the individual responses, previous analysts have had to advance
hypotheses to explain how such a "transmitting error" might have arisen.
The explanation which historically has received the most favorable review
is that advanced by Robert Ferber and Millard Hastay, who suggested
that the understatement of four-quarter change in the published shippers'
forecasts arose from the inclusion of a large group of respondents in the
sample who arbitrarily reported an anticipation of "no change." For this
hypothesis to be operationally valid, the proportion of individual respond-
ents arbitrarily forecasting "no change" should be roughly constant
from survey to survey and should be at least as large as the size of the
downward bias in the surveys.'9 The available evidence indicates that this
proportion is neither large nor constant. A breakdown of the respondents
in each Dun and ]3radstreet survey into the proportions expecting an
increase in sales, a decrease in sales, and no change, is available since the
inception of the surveys. Over this period the proportion of respondents
who forecasted no change in sales never exceeded 30 per cent and varied
substantially from survey to survey, reaching a minimum of 12 per cent. 20
Thus,even if all the respondents who reported "no change" had been
doing so arbitrarily, the proportion of such forecasts would still be much
too small and variable to account for the known understatement of the
survey. Moreover, an analysis of the four surveys for which we have
data on individual responses indicates that many respondents who make
such a forecast also report no change in actual sales over the preceding
four quarters. The fact that the proportion of respondents reporting "no
change" in the past is a sensible function of the business cycle suggests
that such respondents do expect that sales will continue to be unchanged
from the previous year's level. Since the size of the rest of the group fore-
casting "no change" also fluctuates with the movement of seasonally
adjusted sales, it is likely that a number of these forecasts are also not just
arbitrary responses. Although a number of "no change" forecasts are
probably made arbitrarily from time to time, all the available evidence
19Thisis of course a necessary but not a sufficient condition. As it happens this
condition seems to be satisfied in both the Canadian and the Illinois employment fore-
cast surveys, and it has been suggested that the Ferber—Hastay hypothesis therefore
applies to these surveys. Hartle has in fact used this hypothesis as the basis of his in-
triguing explanation of the lesser degree of understatement in the employment anticipa-
tions (see Ferber's paper and Hartle's comment in this volume). But in addition to this
condition, the Ferber-Hastay hypothesis requires that the nonarbitrary forecasts in each
survey be nonregressive. This we shall later show is not true for the Canadian survey.
20Thefigures quoted are based on an analysis of data through April, 1954, which were
made available to the authors in convenient summary form through the courtesy of
Millard Hastay. A less systematic examination of later surveys does not suggest signifi-
cantly different conclusions.
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suggests that such forecasts do not represent a significant fraction of the
total. For the Dun and Bradstreet survey, the Ferber—Hastay hypothesis
thus does not appear to provide an explanation of even just an important
part of the downward bias and regressiveness of the forecasts, and there
seems little ground for supposing that this ingenious hypothesis might
fare better when applied to the shippers' forecasts.
Hart has suggested that the aggregate industry forecasts published by
the shippers' survey are regressive because the original four-quarter
expectations of firms—expectations which are themselves nonregressive—
get repeatedly squashed and distorted as they pass through the various
stages preceding publication. Michael Lovell's evidence indicates that
such purposeful understatement does occur in the aggregation of the
replies, and it is probable that this "sin of commission" also arises in the
replies of the traffic managers themselves. Anticipated carloadings seldom
are the basis for operating decisions, and there may in some cases be little
communication between the traffic manager and executives responsible
for planning and forecasting.2' In such an event, it is questionable whether
the traffic manager's forecast would reflect the operating expectations;
his forecasts might be made simply as a "conservative" extrapolation of
recent shipments tempered by what he hears about the outlook for his
firm.22 Even in those cases where information on his firm's operating
expectations is furnished to the traffic manager, considerable distortion
might still arise, since the traffic manager wishing to be conservative quite
conceivably might cut down his forecast as he translates the firm's operat-
ing expectations into a forecast of carloadings.23
21 Interviews conducted by the Merrill project with executives directly or indirectly
responsible for forecasting and planning activity in their firms revealed that, in many
instances, these executives were not aware of the shippers' forecasts or of the participa-
tion of the traffic manager in the survey. Modigliani still has a vivid recollection of one
instance in which the president of a medium-sized company summoned the traffic
manager in the midst of the interview and castigated him for not telling him about his
participation in the shippers' survey.
22 That the forecasts might be made in this fashion need not imply that the traffic
manager had no evidence about his firm's operations other than a record of carloadings,
which is what Hart seems to suggest. Nor need such an explanation—even if it purported
to explain all the regressiveness of the survey—require for its validity that extrapolative
naïve-model projections better the predictive performance of the shippers' forecasts,
corrected or uncorrected. (However, ef. Hart's last two paragraphs of the section
"Statistical Conservatism.")
23 As Hart has pointed out, this "conservative" editing of the original anticipations
can give rise to regressive forecasts and at the same time be "reasonable" only if the
editors confuse one-quarter change with four-quarter change through an inability to
differentiate between seasonal fluctuations and nonseasonal movements. An interesting
though scarcely conôlusive test of the importance of this will be provided by an examina-
tion of the April 1948 Dun and Bradstreet survey, which asked respondents to forecast
sales for the entire year. Since some of the confusion about the seasonal component of
change should thus be avoided, we should expect that the April survey should be
significantly less regressive than the others if "conservative" editing were an important
cause of regressiveness.
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The hypothesis thus has an appealing a priori plausibility. Can it
explain a significant part of the regressiveness of the survey forecasts? To
answer this question, we must analyze the anticipations of the individual
respondents. If these expectations exhibit little of the regressiveness
associated with the published forecasts, then we can safely conclude that
the regressiveness is introduced during the transmission and aggregation
of the individual responses. But if the individual firm's anticipations are
themselves significantly regressive, then, to the extent that they are, any
distortions which arise in the survey procedures must be that much less
significant in accounting for the bias in the aggregate forecasts.
Are the Expectations of Individual Firms Really Nonregressive?
Information on individual responses is not available for the shippers'
survey. However, the forecasts of individual establishments together with
a record of actual changes in their employment were available to Hartle in
his analysis of the Canadian employers' survey. He reports that the signs
of the errors in the forecasts of employment made by each establishment
tended to be the same at each target date, which implies that the errors in
the aggregate forecasts were a reflection of similar errors in the individual
responses. Even more revealing, he found that the establishments sampled
at each time persistently underestimated the magnitudes of the non-
seasonal changes in their future employment.24 These findings are not by
themselves conclusive evidence that the expectations of the respondents
are biased. Hartle made a survey of firms in the employment survey's
sample which suggests that many of the firms do not use predictions of
their future employment in making their operating plans.25 The forecasts
of employment made by personnel managers consequently may often
reflect operating expectations only to a limited extent, so that distortions
could conceivably be introduced by personnel managers in their trans-
mission of the anticipations of their firms.
Fortunately a much more conclusive test can be carried out with data
available for some of the Dun and Bradstreet surveys.26 Of all current
variables, expectations about future sales are the most likely basis of
businessmen's operating plans as well as the source from which forecasts
of shipments and of employment are most likely to be derived. The antici-
pations of sales collected by Dun and Bradstreet are obtained by personal
24 Hartle, pp. 43-46.
25 See Hartle's comment in this volume.
26 The data consists of a complete record of the individual responses to all questions
asked in the surveys taken in April of 1948 and in May, August, September, October,
and November of 1949, made available to the Merrill project through the courtesy of
DunandBradstreet. The identity of the individual respondents was not disclosed, each
firm being identified only by a code number. The responding firms were, however,
classified by a two digit SIC classification and, in some cases, were further broken down
by approximate sales volume.
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interview, reportedly from persons responsible for their firm's plans and
expectations about the future, and we may consequently be confident
that most of the reported forecasts represent the original
expectations of the respondents.
operating
Chart 3 shows a scatter of the four-quarter change in sales anticipated
by 39 firms in the machinery industry which were sampled by the Dun and





Forecast Change and Past Change in Sales for Individual
Respondents in the Machinery Industry in the
October 1949 Survey
to the survey by these respondents. One thing that is immediately apparent
from this graph is that the individual anticipations do not bear a common
mechanical relation to past change. The scatter is substantial: the correla-
tion coefficient is only 0.51 which, though highly significant, is still small.
In spite of this wide scatter, the trend-reversing tendency of the anticipa-
tions is immediately apparent. Out of 39 observations only 10, about a
quarter, fall in the clearly extrapolative region—a proportion even larger
than is typical. By contrast, 21 observationsfall in the trend reversal
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3 fall on the borderline represented by the 45° line; the remaining five are
unclassifiable since they report no change in the past. The overall impres-
sion engendered by this distribution is fully confirmed by the regression
equation:
(10)' (E1JA1_4)—1 =O.46[(A1_1/A1_5)—11—0.014
The regression coefficient is much less than unity and is quite close to the
value recurring in the analysis of the relation between anticipated and
actual change.
Graphs similar to Chart 3 could be exhibited for all the industries and
surveys for which the required information is available. That such graphs
would all reveal much the same relation between anticipated and past
change is indicated by Table 2, which presents the constant terms, slope
TABLE 2
Parameters of the Regressions of [(E,/At_4)— 1] on [(A,..i/A,-.5)— 1]



































36Electrical machinery 8—49 .52 .44 — .022
parameters, and correlation coefficients of the regressions of —1]
on 1] among individual respondents for a sample of some
of the large industry subsamples.
A useful summary view of the regressive nature of the response is
provided in Table 3, which presents for each survey a cross-tabulation of
the expected four-quarter change in sales against the direction of the past
change in sales for all respondents who provided a quantitative answer
to both questions. It includes four of the six surveys for which such
information was available to us. One of the remaining surveys was con-
ducted in September 1949 and asked the same anticipatory question as the
August survey; the other was made in October and asked the same
question as the November survey. It seemed unlikely that the replies to
these surveys could provide much useful additional evidence, and they
were therefore not tabulated. The industries covered are all those available.
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regions of Charts 2 and 3, which we have attempted to make clear in our
arrangement of Table 3. For instance, the entries in the upper right and
lower left corners of each component table correspond to the regions
bounded by the 45° line and the vertical axis in the northeast and south-
west quadrants of Chart 3. These entries indicate the number of respond-
ents who reported that 1] would have the same sign and be
of greater magnitude than —1].The sum of these figures (9.7
per cent plus 2.8 per cent in the April 1948 survey) thus represents the
total number of responses which are clearly extrapolative.
The frequency of such extrapolative forecasts is rather small, ranging
from a minimum of 11.5 per cent in the November survey to a maximum
of 24 per cent in the May survey and averaging about 17 per cent. Much
larger is the frequency of respondents who expect a reversal of the recent
trend. These respondents, whose responses are tabulated in six entries in
each table making up Table 3, account for an average of 51.5 per cent of
the respondents in the samples.27 Of these responses, about three quarter
are regressive in the classic sense of the word: the expected four-quarter
change is in the same direction as past change but of a lesser (though not
necessarily nonzero) magnitude.
The remaining five entries in each table, which generally account for
somewhat over 30 per cent of the total respondents, fall into two groups.
First is a group for whom [(E1/A1_4)— 1] and [(A1_1/A1_5)— 1] are equal,
corresponding to responses on the 45° boundary line in Chart 3. Although
by no means negligible, the number of such respondents seems small,
ranging from 12 per cent of the sample in November to 21 per cent in
August. One might have anticipated that this type of response would be
frequent, both because it corresponds roughly to an extrapolation of level
and because it is the easiest response for a respondent.who, whether from
uncertainty or lack of interest, prefers to make an arbitrary projection of
his record of past four-quarter change. The fact that a number of respond-
ents report expected change equal to past change for all the variables
surveyed by Dun and Bradstreet indicates that some of these responses do
originate in "psychological inertia." But the frequency of such responses
is evidently not large; the great diversity of the patterns of responses
27Thesix entries are: (1) up in the past, less up expected; (2) up in the past, no
four-quarter change expected; (3) up in the past, decrease expected; (4) decrease in the
past, less down expected in the future; (5) decrease in the past, no four-quarter change
expected; (6) decrease in the past, increase expected. Actually, the proportion of
responses which are regressive may be even greater than 51.5 per cent. Both the surveys
of May 1949 and August 1949 were made several quarters after an important cyclical
turning point so that, particularly in the industries most widely represented in each
survey sample, the movement in sales between t—4 and t—Iwas in the opposite
direction to that which had previously occurred between r—5 and t—4. As a conse-
quence, a number of forecasts which we have classified as extrapolative or non-
classifiable are, in these two surveys, probably regressive. (Cf. Surveyof Current Business,
December1953, Tables 2 and 5, pp. 21—28).
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strongly suggests that the respondents customarily endeavor to give
honest and thoughtful answers to the questions of these surveys.28
The last remaining group of respondents are those who report no change
over the previous year and who therefore cannot be classified in terms of
extrapolation or reversal of trend. There is a strong tendency for these
respondents to expect no change in the future. Firms reporting no past
change account for nearly 30 per cent of the no change expectations even
though they represent only 14 per cent of the total responses. This should
scarcely be surprising. Evidence from Table 3 on the variation of the
proportion of total respondents reporting no past change also suggests
that such reports—and the forecasts associated with them—are very
seldom arbitrary. The largest frequency of reports of no past change
occurred in the first survey, when the level of activity of nondurable
industries had increased only moderately over the previous year. In the
surveys of May and August, 1949, when the level of manufacturing activity
had declined rather severely from the previous year, the proportion fell
to 12 and 10 per cent. And, as the rate of decline in manufacturing activity
leveled off, the proportion of respondents reporting no past change
increased to 17 per cent in the November survey.
The regressive tendency of individual anticipations indicated by Table 3
can be made even more vividly apparent by analyzing the entries of the
table in a somewhat more summary fashion. Table 4 presents this sum-
mary by contrasting the past change reported by the respondents with the
anticipated direction of change from current levels implied by their four-
quarter expectation. The relation of the difference between SEandsA,_1
to that between 1] and 1] has to be qualified by
the considerations discussed in Section 4, but, subject to these qualifica-
tions, the impression given by this table is clear. Of the 1,086 respondents
in all four surveys for whom such a division is relevant, somewhat more
than 60 per cent report anticipations which are regressive.
28Somemore direct evidence is available on this point. Modigliani has had occasion
to talk to some of the Dun and Bradstreet interviewers and was assured, in every case,
that the respondents took the questionnaire seriously and frequently looked up figures
from their records. Respondents have the option of not answering a question at all, or
of indicating the expected direction of change but not quantifying the answer, and a
number avail themselves of this opportunity. A cursory analysis of the number of refusals
yields patterns which correspond to what one would expect from businessmen who took
the questionnaire seriously. The smallest refusal rate is typically for the price question:
refusals to answer run about 5 per cent or less, and refusals to quantify are only
slightly more frequent. For the sales question, the rate of refusal is somewhat higher,
about 15 per cent, but the difference is mostly due to the greater frequency of "no
answer." The largest refusal rate occurs for new orders in nondurable goods industries,
where it comes close to 50 per cent, for the fairly obvious reason that the question is often
not relevant. The fact that almost as many respondents do not report the past change in
new orders bears this out. Finally, a high and variable number of firms, ranging from
20 to 40 percent,refuse to give definite answers to the profit question, though a large
proportion of these refusals represent an understandable reluctance to quantify.
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TABLE 4
Implied Expected Change in Sales from Current Level in Relation to






Same as past, or no change 44 36
Opposite to past 56 64
Number of respondents 484 602
Both the limited information available for the Canadian employers'
survey and the extensive evidence available for the Dun and Bradstreet
survey point clearly to only one conclusion. The short-run anticipations
which individual firms report to surveys of businessmen's expectations of
the four-quarter change in operating variables tend, on the average, to
be quite strikingly regressive.29
This is a surprising result. It evidently contradicts the presumption
upon which Hart and other previous analysts have based their attempts to
explain the regressiveness in these surveys. For if we accept Hart's claim
that the operating expectations of businessmen cannot possibly be regres-
sive, we are forced to conclude that what people claim to expect is not
what they "really" expect. This distinction between real and reported
anticipations seems, when viewed in the light of the evidence on the care
with which respondents generally reported their anticipations, to be more
an invitation to metaphysical dispute than an operationally significant
proposal. Yet if we reject this distinction, we must accept the implication
that individual anticipations really are regressive. This implication in turn
seems to contradict common sense notions about the relationship between
operating plans and expectations.
We thus seem to have reached an impasse. How can the evidence we
have introduced be reconciled with our a priori notions of what business-
men's expectations should be? In a forthcoming article we shall show that
29 It should be reiterated that one of the Dun and Bradstreet surveys which provide
evidence for this striking regressiveness asked respondents to predict sales for the entire
year (compared, of course, to those of the previous year). Indeed, there are some indica-
tions that regressiveness may prevail even for expectations of yearly sales, which do not
involve comparison with same time last year. For instance, Robert Eisner, analyzing the
relation between the expected change in sales from 1949 to 1950 and the actual change
from 1948 to 1949, for a sample of some 160 firms, found that the correlation was
negative (though not significant at the 5 per cent level). (See "Expectations, Plans and
Capital Expenditures: A Synthesis of Ex Post and Ex Ante Data" in Expectations,
Uncertainty andBusiness Behaviour, SocialScience Research Council, 1958, Table 2,
p. 172.)
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it is primarily our prior conceptions of what constitute reasonable antici-
pations, and not the implications of the evidence, which must be modified.
We shall show, in fact, not only that it is reasonable to regard individual
firms' anticipations as regressive but also that such regressive expectations
conform to the movement of those firms' sales. The change consequently
necessary in our conception of the way in which individual anticipations
are formed raises significant questions about the way in which the fore-
casts provided by surveys of businessmen's short-run anticipations can be
utilized and improved. These questions, too, will have to be discussed
elsewhere.
COMMENT
ALBERT G. HART AND MARSHALL KOLIN, Columbia University
On several of the points raised by John Bossons and Franco Modigliani,
we may open by recording our agreement.
1. The net predictive value of the "reconstituted" H-prediction (except
as this may serve as a proxy for ex post information which is published
only with a lag) is admittedly modest.
2. The "rolling-mill hypothesis" fails to fit the Dun and Bradstreet
survey. Thus we need either an independent special explanation for the
regressiveness of the Dun and Bradstreet results or some explanation
which will cover the regressiveness of both sets of figures.
3. The suggestion that regressiveness in individual forecasts may have
roots in regressiveness of individual experience brings an important new
element into the discussion, though we see very different applications than
Bossons and Modigliani indicate.
SIGNIFICANCE OF PREDICTIVE VALUE
The central point of the paper to which Bossons and Modigliani are
reacting is not the use of shippers' forecasts to find out what was going to
happen, but their use to find out what shippers' "really" expect to happen.
The basic hypothesis that the reconstituted H-prediction pictures what
they "really" expect requires "failures" of forecasting at turning points.
To give an analogue, suppose we set up a poll of certain unfortunate
commuters, asking them how many minutes they predict morning trains
will take between Stamford and Grand Central Station. We will expect
their forecasts to have predictive value—better than that of the official
time table, and comparable to that of a naïve-model hypothesis based on
the previous day's running time, though perhaps with systematic biases.
We will expect the forecasts to be related to recent experience, becoming
more pessimistic when the New Haven Railroad goes into one of its spells
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of late arrivals.1 But we will not expect the commuter forecasts to tell us
on which days the New Haven will outdo itself by having a string of
derailed freight cars block the tracks for several hours, or how great the
delays will be on such days. If we want to test the bias of commuter fore-
casts, we should compare forecasts with outcomes only for days when
there are no derailments. We should not ignore derailments. They may
affect, for example, the way forecasts are framed for the ensuing week.
But we should give them separate treatment: merely lumping the two kinds
of delay-experience together will obscure rather than clarify our analysis.
THE DUN AND BRADSTREET EVIDENCE
Transforming the four-quarter forecasts reported by Dun and Brad-
street into one-quarter forecasts from the date of estimation yields regres-
sive aggregates. These aggregates, however, are probably dominated by
responses from small firms, whereas the shippers' forecast aggregates are
dominated by responses from large firms. A special explanation for the
Dun and Bradstreet regressiveness—which would not apply to the shippers'
forecast, and which would leave us in need of still another special explana-
tion for the employment-intentions surveys—might be based on the
presumption that small firms are much more likely than large firms to have
frequent quarter-to-quarter reversals of direction in their sales. We are
finding evidence of such a difference by size of firm in a study of sales
experience in the steel industry now in progress at Columbia University.
The fact of a general tendency of forecasters to underestimate the
change from a base date in the past to a reference date in the future is well
established, and a general explanation for this tendency has been well
roughed out by Theil.2 But the grossness of the understatement, leading to
implicit forecasts of reversal of the recent movement, remains puzzling.
We are unconvinced by the Bossons—Modigliani suggestion that this result
rests on regressiveness of individual-firm experience. But this debate
must be adjourned to an occasion when a sufficient body of data on
individual-firm experience is on the table.
BUSINESS-CYCLE IMPLICATIONS OF "REGRESSIVENESS"
Bossons and Modigliani seem to imply that any preference for an extra-
polative over a regressive model of what businessmen "really" expect
can only be sentimental. But have they considered the implications of the
1Amore fundamental test of whether commuters "really" expect the trip to take
abnormally long is whether at least some of them act upon their forecasts by leaving the
house abnormally early for the station (or by arranging to avoid early appointments at
the office). If current expectations are "really" more pessimistic than last month, there
will be an increased proportion of commuters making such provision for extra slow
commuting.
2H.Theil, EconomicForecastsand Policy, North—Holland Publishing Company,
Amsterdam, p. 154.
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hypothesis that expectations are "really" regressive? By "really expect,"
we might appropriately mean "place bets upon" through forward-looking
action, whatever verbalizations may be found in a survey.
Now if expectations are really regressive in this sense, we must infer that
the whole course of a business upswing is a series of agreeable surprises,
which keep things going up despite a tendency of business to reverse the
upswing by decisions to cut back inventory, staffing, procurement, and
the like. Admitting that it is hard to systematize the use of business-cycle
evidence in this connection, we assert that our preference for nonregressive
models is not sentimental. Rather, it reflects the large body of facts which
lead most analysts of fluctuations to give much weight to "cumulative"
elements in expansion and contraction, and to doubt the inherent stability
of the business process. In the light of these facts, how can expectations
simultaneously be regressive and be linked up with the decision processes
which generate business fluctuations?
REPLY BY MR. BossoNs AND MR. MODIGLIANI
It is true that small firms are somewhat more likely than large firms to
have frequent quarter-to-quarter reversals of direction in their sales, and
it is generally recognized that the forecasting errors of smaller firms are
larger than those of large firms. We doubt, however, that the "extra"
regressiveness in forecasts made by smaller firms is sufficient to provide
an explanation of the regressiveness of the aggregate Dun and Bradstreet
forecasts. An examination of several of the larger industries in the August
1949 survey—which in its reporting of responses and its position in the
cycle is the most "typical" survey for which we have individual data—
indicates no obvious systematic tendency for forecasts to become more
regressive as the size of firm decreases. For the August survey as a whole,
roughly 55percent of the responses of firms in the largest size-class in
each industry were regressive—a somewhat greater proportion, in other
words, than the 48.4 per cent of all responses in the survey sample which
were regressive. Although we have not tallied the responses by size group
for other surveys, a cursory investigation indicates that the responses of
the larger firms are equally regressive in the April 1948 and November
1949 surveys.
Hart's attempt at avoiding a metaphysical dispute over what respond-
ents mean by their forecast, by defining "real" expectations as what
businessmen would place bets upon, is interesting though perhaps less
operational than. it sounds. Unfortunately, a survey of verbalized expecta-
tions cannot help us measure the distribution which is attached to a point
forecast by the respondent or the utility function with which he evaluates
this distribution.It cannot, therefore, help us measure what bets the
respondents will place as a result of their stated anticipations. Because
of the limited space here available, we shall have to leave to a later article
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a discussion of the relationship of regressive expectations to operating
decisions through the course of the business cycle. We should state that
we have considered the implications of truly regressive expectations, and
that we do not regard such expectations (even defined as point forecasts
a Ia Hart) as incompatible with the actual movements of inventories and
other operating variables. But this we will have to substantiate in another
place.
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